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ABSTRACT
Abstract ▌3
The current policy debate on R&D subsidies has main-
ly focussed on the effectiveness of R&D subsidies, 
whereas the academic literature has to a large extent 
looked into which companies receive R&D subsidies 
and why. The latter has acknowledged the need to 
control for a potential sample selection issue, caused 
by the fact that not all companies apply for R&D sub-
sidies, and has proposed the use of control groups 
and treatment effect models. The application of these 
models remains however scarce, given the limited 
understanding of which factors drive companies to 
apply for R&D subsidies. Using a Heckman selection 
model, this paper analyzes which young technology 
based firms receive R&D subsidies, while taking into 
account the likelihood of application. Analyzing a sam-
ple of 225 young technology based firms in Flanders, 
we found that entrepreneurial firms disposing of less 
financing were more likely to apply for R&D subsidies, 
whereas firms led by teams disposing of higher levels 
of commercial experience were less likely to apply for 
R&D subsidies. Controlling for likelihood of applica-
tion, we found that more heterogeneous teams were 
more likely to receive R&D subsidies. 
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INTRODUCTION
Government programs that subsidize commercial R&D 
are justified on the grounds that firms underinvest in 
R&D (David et al., 2000; Wallsten, 2000). Typically, 
empirical studies have analysed to which extent pri-
vate R&D expenditures have increased as a result of 
the subsidy. If R&D grants just substitute private R&D 
expenditures that would otherwise also have taken 
place, then this is considered to be a crowding out ef-
fect, else it is not. Many of the earlier studies do find a 
correlation between subsidies and R&D expenditures, 
but fail to recognize a crowding out or not; they fail to 
provide an understanding of whether firms which re-
ceive grants increase their levels of R&D expenditures 
or whether more R&D intensive firms simply are better 
in obtaining grants (David et al., 2000).
As a result, the econometric literature has focussed 
on the sample selection issue, which means that if 
one wants to analyse the additionality of subsidies, 
the sample should be corrected for those companies 
which perform R&D but do not get any grants. For in-
stance, Criscuolo et al. (2007) have shown that stud-
ies which fail to account for this selection bias do suf-
fer from a large downward bias. In order to correct for 
such a bias, a more in depth insight is needed into 
the factors which can explain which firms do receive a 
grant and which ones do not get grants although they 
belong to the population of eligible companies (for in-
stance because they engage in R&D activities).
In line with this, received empirical literature started 
to analyse the differences between companies that 
receive grants and those that do not receive grants. 
Czarnitzki and Licht (2005) show that supported firms 
in Germany tend to differ from those which did not 
receive R&D subsidies. More specifically, subsidized 
firms were larger, had a separate R&D department 
more frequently, usually had applied for a patent and 
were more likely to be active internationally. In line 
with this, Gonzalez and Pazo (2008) and Gonzalez et 
al. (2005) apply matching estimators to distinguish be-
tween firms that perform R&D and those that do not, 
using the size of the firm and the R&D history of the 
firm as predictors of receiving R&D grants. 
Despite the plea for control groups and treatment ef-
fect models, the application of such models remains 
rather scarce. The reason for this is that we do not 
really understand which factors determine whether a 
given eligible firm applies for a grant or not and, if it ap-
plies for such a grant, which factors determine wheth-
er it will receive the grant or not. Especially if we hold 
size constant and for instance analyse this question 
in a population of SMEs, eligible for R&D grants, the 
determinants of application and success in receiving 
the grant are unknown. This paper addresses this gap 
in the literature and investigates which factors explain 
whether a young technology based firm will apply for a 
grant or not and, if it applies, which ones tend to pre-
dict its chances of success.
We investigate these questions by analysing the appli-
cation behaviour and the application success of a ho-
mogeneous population of 225 young technology based 
firms in Flanders. We use organisational theory and 
more specifically, the resource dependency and self ef-
ficacy theories as theoretical guidelines in building our 
hypotheses. Resource dependency theory views the 
firm as an open system, which is dependent on exter-
nal organizations for the supply of key resources (Pfef-
fer and Salancik, 1978). The more resource constraint 
a company is, the more it will need to look for extra 
resources such as R&D grants to survive. Self efficacy 
theory complements resource dependency theory and 
predicts that managers in resource constraint compa-
nies will look for additional resources in environments 
they are most familiar with. In other words, their back-
ground will determine their search process. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. 
First, we discuss the relevant received literature. Sec-
ond, we present our theoretical framework. In a third 
section, we discuss the sample, the data and the data 
characteristics. Fourth, we present our analyses of the 
main research questions. Finally, we present the con-
clusions, limitations of this study and suggestions for 
further research.
Literature review ▌5
LITERATURE REVIEW1
The literature on the impact of R&D subsidies has 
been focused on the so-called question of crowding 
out. Crowding out means that the public subsidy at 
least partly substitutes the private R&D expenditures 
of the firms which receive the study. Wallsten (2000) 
showed that a subset of publicly traded, young, tech-
nological-intensive firms, reduced their R&D spending 
in the years following the award of a Small Business 
Innovation Research grant, which suggests at least 
a partial crowding out effect. Busom (2000) even re-
ports a full crowding out in about 30 percent of their 
sample of Spanish firms. This is in contrast with for in-
stance Klette and Moen (1997), who report that there 
is little tendency for crowding out in their sample of 
Norwegian firms.
The inconclusive results with respect to the impact 
of R&D subsidies have been attributed to the lack of 
control for “non-treated firms”, i.e. those firms that do 
not make use of subsidies. Still, the few studies which 
have compared subsidized and non-subsidized firms 
conclude that subsidized firms differ in many aspects 
from the non-subsidized ones. Lach (2002) for in-
stance finds that subsidized firms in a sample of Israe-
lian firms tend to be larger than non-subsidized firms. 
Subsidized firms spend on average three times more 
on R&D than non-subsidized ones in Israel and em-
ploy 400 employees on average, whereas the non-sub-
sidized ones only employ 200 employees, on average. 
Building on these results, Czarnitski and Licht (2006) 
also find in a sample of German firms that subsidized 
firms are larger in terms of employees (500 vs 240). 
Furtheron, they find that subsidized firms do have a 
separate R&D department whereas the non-subsidized 
ones do not tend to have such a department. Further, 
they find that older firms are less likely to participate in 
R&D subsidy programs than younger firms, at least in 
Eastern Germany. They also indicate that firms which 
do apply for R&D subsidies have more international ex-
posure than those which do not get into the R&D sub-
sidy game. Finally, they find that firms which receive 
R&D subsidies tend to have significantly more patents 
than those which do not have subsidies. Gonzalez et 
al. (2005, 2008) come to similar conclusions in a sam-
ple of Spanish firms when they compare firms which 
do receive and do not receive R&D subsidies. Only the 
age variable seemed to play an important role. They 
find that age has a positive impact on the likelihood of 
applying for an R&D subsidy. They argue that the more 
experienced firms might be more likely to know how 
to apply for these grants. They also find some sectoral 
differences but do not get into detail as of which sec-
tors differ from each other. 
The studies above do suggest that firms which par-
ticipate in R&D programs do significantly differ on a 
number of dimensions from the ones that do not apply 
for such subsidies. Criscuolo et al. (2007) argue that 
micro-econometric studies which do not take this into 
account significantly underestimate the impact of R&D 
subsidies. They also suggest that scholars have to be 
careful when they construct a model which controls for 
the likelihood of applying for a subsidy. Since subsidy 
applications are not distributed ad random among a 
population of firms, but tend to focus on very specific 
subgroups of firms which are eligible for a subsidy, it 
is not sufficient to analyse the likelihood of applying 
for a subsidy in an ad random group of companies as 
the incidence rate might be quite different from the ex-
perimental group in which the impact of the subsidy is 
studied. In other words, scholars should match the ex-
perimental sample and the control sample quite care-
fully if robust conclusions are to be drawn. The most 
recent papers by Gonzalez et al. (2008) and Czarnitski 
and Licht (2006) do use such an approach of match-
ing samples. Usually, sector and size information is 
used to match samples of companies which apply for 
R&D subsidies.
In summary, we can conclude from the above that un-
derstanding which firms do apply for R&D subsidies 
and which ones do not apply for these subsidies will 
greatly contribute to our understanding of which im-
pact these subsidies have on the total R&D efforts of 
these firms. However, the received literature gives very 
little insights into why companies apply for subsidies 
and why other ones do not apply. Part of this might be 
attributed to the fact that the empirical research so 
far has focused on very heterogeneous populations of 
companies which are representative for the industry 
rather than on homogeneous subpopulations such as 
innovative SMEs, high tech start-ups, ....of which each 
company is in theory eligible of receiving an R&D grant. 
This lack of a homogeneous approach has lead to the 
introduction of matched pair models which mainly re-
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veal that larger firms do apply more for subsidies than 
smaller ones.
In addition, most micro-econometric studies have not 
made a distinction between the factors which deter-
mine whether a given company will apply for a sub-
sidy and those determinants which just distinguish 
between successful and non successful applications. 
They assume that not having received any R&D sub-
sidies equals not having applied for these subsidies. 
Wallsten (2000)’s study is to our knowledge one of the 
only studies which has made a clear distinction in a 
sample of US innovative SMEs which had applied for 
SBIR grants between those which applied for a grant 
and those which were successful in receiving the grant. 
He found that the average size of the beneficiaries was 
larger than of those which got rejected. However, the 
largest innovative SME’s were found in the group of 
eligible companies which never applied for a grant. A 
similar pattern was found for the number of patents 
these companies had applied for. Unfortunately, data 
limitations restricted the external validity of the Wall-
sten study. This study indicates that not making a dis-
tinction between these two phases in the grant appli-
cation process might introduce an oversimplification in 
the sample correction.
In summary, the micro-econometric literature tends to 
overlook the subtle difference between those compa-
nies that do not apply for R&D grants, but are not eli-
gible and those that do not apply for R&D grants, but 
belong to the targeted population of the R&D granting 
institutes. Second, in those studies where a control 
group of ‘non-applicants’ is used to match those that 
do receive R&D subsidies, the non-applicants equal 
the non-recipients. In other words, the difference be-
tween not getting an R&D grant (although applying 
for it) and not applying for the R&D grant is ignored. A 
third shortcoming in the received literature in addition 
to the aforementioned empirical shortcomings, ap-
pears to be a lack of theoretical understanding about 
why companies do or do not apply for grants. The grant 
application equation has been treated as a statisti-
cal correction of the crowding out analysis which has 
a clear theoretical rationale. However, the choice of 
instruments used to predict the probability of apply-
ing for/receiving a grant was seemingly motivated by 
empirical rather than theoretical justifications. While 
the market failure paradigm might justify the existence 
of R&D subsidies and the specific elements of mar-
ket failure might further explain why certain groups of 
companies are targeted with an R&D subsidy program, 
industrial economic theory has difficulties to explain 
why companies of a certain eligible population might 
apply or not apply for such a grant. To explain such a 
form of organisational behaviour, hypotheses need to 
be derived from other theoretical streams such as or-
ganisational economics and organisational behaviour. 
Whereas the first theoretical stream uses individual-
ism and rational choice as an explanation of organisa-
tional choices, the second one takes the collective of 
individual decision makers as the point of departure. 
In the next section of the paper, we will use both lit-
erature streams to explain why we expect some young 
technology based firms to apply for grants or others 
not. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK2
2.1  Applying for R&D subsidies
Young technology based firms typically face major dif-
ficulties in raising financing from traditional sources 
such as banks and public capital markets due to a lack 
of track record and tangible assets which are usually 
required by these finance providers to reduce the un-
certainty of the financing round (Da Rin et al., 2006). 
Therefore, young technology based firms usually turn 
to external sources of capital such as venture capital 
(Wright et al., 2006 ) and angel financing (Mason and 
Harrison, 2003; Ueda, 2004) to get access to sufficient 
funds to realize their growth ambitions. Sohl (2007) 
estimates that in the US 39% of all angel investments 
and 11% of all venture capital investments are made 
in young innovative firms. This shows the importance 
of this source of financing for young technology based 
firms. Moreover, both angel and venture capital invest-
ments are often considered to be “smart” forms of 
capital. Angels for instance are usually persons with 
extent managerial or entrepreneurial experience who 
invest in these companies not only because of finan-
cial reasons but also because they think that they can 
make an important contribution to the further develop-
ment of the company (Mason, 2006). VCs play an ac-
tive role in their portfolio companies and are involved 
in value adding activities, next to the monitoring role 
that they fulfil (Sapienza et al., 1996; Fried et al., 
1998; Knockaert et al., 2006). Entrepreneurs special-
ize in the development of knowledge about combining 
resources to exploit new opportunities (Kirzner, 1973) 
and in the day-to-day development of new business ac-
tivities (MacMillan et al., 1989), while VCs focus main-
ly on creating networks to reduce the cost of acquiring 
capital, to find customers and suppliers and to estab-
lish the venture’s credibility (MacMillan et al., 1989; 
Lam, 1991). VCs also advise their ventures, by help-
ing entrepreneurs to formulate their business strategy, 
and identifying appropriate management (Steier and 
Greenwood, 1995).  
As a result of this, we would expect venture capital and 
business angel financing to be the most likely forms 
of capital young technology based firms aim for. Only 
those young technology based firms, which do not 
succeed in finding venture capital nor business angel 
financing will try to access less flexible forms of capi-
tal such as R&D grants. R&D grants require that the 
money is invested to further develop the technology, 
not to commercialize an innovative product and as 
such do put a number of constraints on the expendi-
ture pattern of the grant money. . Further, R&D grants 
often bring along an administrative expense  which is 
difficult to support for a young technology based firm. 
Therefore, we assume that only if the young technol-
ogy based firm does lack other forms of capital, it will 
apply for an R&D grant. 
This leads us to the following hypothesis:  
When studying behaviour (in this case, the decision 
to apply for R&D subsidies), however, the individual 
level should not be overlooked. The theory of planned 
behaviour operates on the premise that the best way 
to predict behaviour is to measure behavioural inten-
tion, which in turn is seen to be a function of three 
variables: attitude, subjective norm and perceived 
behavioural control (Azjen, 1985; 1988). Self-efficacy 
is a function of perceived behavioural control and fre-
quently emerges as the most significant predictor of 
both intention and behaviour (Armitage and Conner, 
2001). Self-efficacy influences the motivation and abil-
ity to engage in specific behaviour (Bandura, 1977), as 
well as the pursuit of certain tasks (Bandura, 1986). 
Self-efficacy suggests that people who think they can 
perform well at a task do better than those who think 
they will fail (Gist and Mitchell, 1992). Thus, people 
perform activities and pick social environments they 
judge themselves capable of managing (Wood and 
Bandura, 1989). Following the similar-to-me hypothe-
sis (Franke et al., 2006), these environments would be 
environments in which people operate that are similar 
to them. Similarity is perceived as rewarding and dis-
similarity works as a negative reinforcement (Lefkow-
itz, 2000). The theory of planned behaviour and the 
concept of self-efficacy originated in psychology 
(Byrne, 1971), and has been applied recently in behav-
iour economics and management studies, for instance 
to explain post-investment behaviour by venture capi-
H1: the more capital constraint a young technol-
ogy based firm is, the higher the likelihood that it 
will apply for R&D grants 
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talists (Knockaert et al., 2006), to explain attitudes 
and intention towards self-employment (Souitaris et 
al., 2007), and to explain the career decision-making 
process (Giles and Rea, 1999). The latter study for in-
stance found that, based on self-efficacy, men were 
less likely to apply for jobs in female-dominated occu-
pations. Finally, Tierney and Farmer (2002) examined 
self-efficacy to understand creative actions in organi-
sational settings.
Based on self-efficacy, we hypothesize that entrepre-
neurs who feel their chances of success when apply-
ing for R&D subsidies are minimal, will not apply for 
R&D subsidies, given the resource constraints they 
are already faced with and that force them to direct 
their efforts into activities with potential success. This 
will not only be the case for the lead entrepreneur, 
but will apply to all top management team members, 
given that strategic issues are rarely diagnosed and/
or addressed by a single individual but rather by a top 
management team (Dutton et al., 1983). Building on 
the similarity hypothesis, we hypothesize that high 
tech entrepreneurs will feel their chances of success 
are minimal in case of dissimilarity between the en-
trepreneur and the R&D subsidy evaluator. Given that 
the latter mainly disposes of technical human capital 
(all R&D subsidy evaluators predominantly dispose of 
technical human capital), we argue that teams mainly 
disposing of technical human capital will feel confident 
of their potential success given the similarity of their 
human capital with that of the R&D subsidy evaluator, 
and will therefore be more likely to apply for R&D sub-
sidies. Subsequently, teams with more commercial hu-
man capital will feel less confident on their chances of 
success given the dissimilarity between their human 
capital and that of the R&D subsidy evaluators. There-
fore, we offer the following hypotheses:
H2: management teams disposing of technical 
human capital are more likely to apply for R&D 
subsidies than the average
H3: management teams disposing of commer-
cial human capital are less likely to apply for 
R&D subsidies than the average
2.2 Getting R&D Subsidies
Earlier on in this paper, we argued that most econo-
metric studies do not make a distinction between ap-
plying for and successfully receiving a grant. Whereas 
the decision to apply for a grant or not is made by the 
young technology based firm itself, the decision wheth-
er the focal firm also will receive a grant or not is made 
by government bureaucrats. Although the theoretical 
justification for R&D subsidies is to be found in the 
argumentation that otherwise these projects would 
not have been undertaken, Jaffe et al. (1998) observe 
that in practice government programs usually are not 
designed to be evaluated in such a way. Therefore, 
politicians are quite unlikely to continue to support a 
program which picks many projects that fail or refuses 
to select commercially attractive proposals. Therefore, 
government bureaucrats who manage these funds will 
act more as external financiers, trying to fund projects 
with higher success probabilities and with clearly 
identifiable results, i.e. private rates of return (Lach, 
2002).
We might thus assume that the criteria which are seen 
to be key in the selection behaviour of a private inves-
tor providing financing to young technology based firms 
will be similar to those that determine whether the 
young technology based firm receives an R&D grant or 
not. The venture capital literature has had a long tradi-
tion in analysing which criteria venture capitalists find 
important when evaluating a potential deal (Hall and 
Hofer 1993; McMillan et al. 1985; 1987; Muzyka et al. 
1996). The two most important ones which seem to be 
consistently reported by these studies relate to a) the 
quality of the team which presents the proposal and b) 
the product/market characteristics of the deal. 
In line with these findings, the quality of the team in 
explaining the success of a young technology based 
firm has been the subject of empirical research in the 
entrepreneurship literature. Heirman and Clarysse 
(2007) show that teams with a balance of technical 
and commercial skills are more successful in bring-
ing products to the market in young technology based 
firms. A finding which was confirmed in Wright et al. 
(2007)’s work on academic entrepreneurship. Teams 
with a mix of technical and commercial skills are better 
able to adapt to the opportunities offered by complex 
environments and have better decision making skills 
than homogeneous teams. Therefore we hypothesize:
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The second characteristic, which ranks high on the list 
of criteria which is used by the VC community is the 
attractivity and size of the product market segment in 
which the company is situated. To assess the market 
potential, venture capitalists usually undertake a due 
diligence of the venture’s business. During such a due 
diligence, experts are hired to evaluate the market op-
portunity and customers or potential customers are 
interviewed to validate the assumptions made in the 
venture’s business plan. Doing so, venture capitalist 
tries to reduce the information asymmetry related to 
the new venture. In contrast to venture capitalists, who 
do have sufficient resources to perform a lengthy and 
thorough due diligence, government bureaucrats can-
not afford this kind of investment. Instead, they tend to 
base their decision on observable characteristics that 
are often correlated with the unobserved quality of the 
venture (Stuart et al., 1999)
Raising venture capital financing therefore can be 
seen as a signal of quality to other stakeholders. Ac-
cording to Davila et al. (2003), VC funding events are 
important signals about the quality of the new venture, 
diminishing uncertainty for employees, and increasing 
credibility, and thus enhancing the likelihood of new 
employees joining the company. Megginson and Weiss 
(1991) indicate that the reputation of some long-exist-
ing VC companies is second to none, and their pres-
ence in the capital structure sends a strong positive 
signal to other investors and stakeholders. Stuart et 
al. (1999) found that privately held biotech firms with, 
amongst others, organizational equity investors went 
to IPO faster and earned greater valuations at IPO than 
firms that lack such connections. Therefore, we pro-
pose:
H4: young technology based firms managed by a 
management team with balanced human capital 
will have a higher probability of successful ap-
plication than those applied for by unbalanced 
teams.
H5: young technology based firms which have at-
tracted venture capital at the moment of applica-
tion will have a higher probability of successful 
application than those which have not.
Although the venture capital literature is instrumental 
in understanding which ventures do seem promising 
on a commercial site and which do not, the received 
literature on VC investments did not really investigate 
the role of VCs in ‘technology’ ventures’. Still, the tech-
nology component adds an additional dimension to 
these ventures. For instance, Mc Cann (1991) and Lee 
et al. (2001), highlight the importance of technologi-
cal protection through patents to create value in high 
tech new ventures. Their argument is that the future of 
some of these new ventures does not lie in the com-
mercialization of a product and the related realization 
of organic growth. Instead, value is created through 
building up a patent portfolio and collaborating with 
other parties, and playing on a market of ideas instead 
of a market for products (Gans and Stern, 2003). In 
line with this argument Decheneaux et al. (2008) show 
that patents are very important if high tech firms want 
to appropriate the rents of their R&D investments. Stu-
art et al. (1999) show that patents shorten the time to 
IPO for young technology based firms.
Building on the literature above, Hausler et al. (2009) 
show in a population of German and British young bio-
tech firms that having a patent gives a signal to the 
investment community, which then leads to a shorter 
time to receiving venture capital. Having filed at least 
one patent reduces the time to the first VC investment 
by 76%. Although these results are achieved in an in-
dustry where the appropriability regime is rather tight 
(Gans and Stern, 2003), they still are impressive and 
suggest that patents might have a signalling effect in 
a broader population of young technology based firms 
as a quality label that convinces not only private in-
vestors but also R&D granting institutes. We therefore 
propose :
H6: young technology based firms which have 
filed a patent at the moment of application will 
have a higher probability of successful applica-
tion than those which have not.
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METHODOLOGY3
We study young technology based firms in Flanders, 
which is a small, export-intensive economy located in 
the Northern part of Belgium. The advantage of focus-
ing on one homogeneous region is that it reduces the 
non-measured variance resulting from environmental 
conditions. We used four different databases on start-
ups in Flanders identify the young technology based 
firms and compile our sample: (1) a database of all 
firms founded since 1991 in high tech and medium 
high tech sectors, (2) a database of spin-offs from 
the different Flemish universities, (3) a database of 
all firms that received R&D subsidies from the IWT, 
(4) lists of 189 companies in the portfolio of Belgian 
venture capital investors. We conducted telephone in-
terviews to a random sample of 500 firms in the first 
database and to all firms in the other databases to 
check whether the firms met the definition of young 
technology based firm and to ask the founder’s coop-
eration in this research project. Based on the random 
sampling procedure we estimate the total population 
of young technology based firms in Flanders founded 
between 1991 and 2005 to comprise about 750 firms. 
We interviewed 354 of these RBSUs. For this paper 
on growth, we use the data on the 224 firms founded 
between 1991 and 2005. 
The mean total employment size is 21 with the ma-
jority of the firms employing less than 7 people. Over-
all, the young technology based firms appear to be a 
group of firms of particular interest to policy-makers. 
In a relatively short time, they have created apparently 
growing businesses in a wide range of technologies, 
including software (42%), micro-electronics (12%), 
medical-related technologies, including biotech (17%) 
and others (29%). 
Data collection ▌11
DATA COLLECTION4
We reconstructed the life histories of the young tech-
nology based firms during personal interviews with the 
founders. To do so, we used milestone events to recon-
struct the company history. During each interview, we 
asked the founder to talk about the start-up and the 
key events that marked the early life of their compa-
nies. Next, we further questioned the founder about 
the starting resources. Using concrete events makes 
it easier to solicit more reliable retrospective informa-
tion. Next, we used a structured questionnaire1  to col-
lect quantitative data on the firm’s starting resources. 
We targeted the founders because they typically pos-
ses the most comprehensive knowledge on the organi-
zation’s history, strategy, and performance (Carter et 
al., 1994). We also collected secondary data (such as 
company balance sheets, press releases, yearly re-
1 The questionnaire as well as the manual for the database (i.e. the 
list of variables and how they are coded) can be obtained from the 
first author upon request.
ports, company brochures,…) as much as possible to 
double-check information and enhance the reliability 
of the data. The combination of in-depth qualitative 
interview data and detailed archival and survey data 
makes it possible to bring new insights as well as to 
test our hypotheses statistically. The information ob-
tained during the interviews was cross-checked with 
secondary data sources such as Belfirst where possi-
ble.
The main R&D granting institute in Flanders (IWT) pro-
vided us with information on the year of first R&D sub-
sidy application, and whether or not the R&D subsidy 
was granted. Of the 220 companies, 158 companies, 
or 76% had applied for an R&D subsidy. 120 of these 
158 companies (or 76%) received the subsidy.   
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R&D GRANTS IN FLANDERS: IWT5
The institute for Innovation by Science and Technology 
(IWT) is the innovation agency of the Flemish govern-
ment. IWT was established in 1991 with the purpose of 
stimulating innovation in Flanders in multiple ways. On 
the one hand IWT offers innovation-related services to 
Flemish companies, such as to find cross-border part-
ners or technology transfer support, and encourages 
close collaboration of all actors engaged in innovation 
through the Flemish Innovation Network. On the other 
hand IWT grants every year more than 260 million 
euro in the form of subsidies to companies, research 
institutes, individual researchers. About 30% of the di-
rect financial support measures are R&D/innovation 
grants for individual companies via the industrial R&D 
funding program. This program provides direct support 
to firms for research and development projects initi-
ated with the purpose of developing innovative solu-
tions. With innovation is meant that the projects must 
result in new knowledge that has practical applica-
tions leading to the creation of economic added value 
and possibly other benefits for Flemish society. Large 
companies based or with an active branch in Flanders 
as well as SMEs are eligible for these subsidies. For 
SMEs there is also a specific SME programme for inno-
vation studies and innovation projects, with adapted 
procedures and projects. It is also possible to submit 
the R&D/innovation project with other companies or 
research institutes. The funding awarded by IWT is a 
percentage of the eligibility costs of the project. Indus-
trial R&D projects may also be part of a larger interna-
tional project with parties outside Flanders.
Within the industrial R&D funding programme the ba-
sic funding rate is 15% for development projects and 
40% for research projects. The first type of project is 
mainly focused on the application of knowledge for 
the development of new or modernized products, 
processes or services, while research projects are pri-
marily focused on the production of new knowledge 
that might eventually lead to innovation. Additional 
support may be granted on various grounds. A project 
that meets specific policy objectives may be eligible for 
an additional 10%. Small firms (SEs) may be eligible 
for an additional 20% and mid-sized firms (ME’s) for 
an additional 10%. If the project involves substantial 
collaboration with either a large firm or at the interna-
tional level, it may be eligible for an additional 10%. 
The subsidy goes from a minimum of 15% to a maxi-
mum of 80%. SMEs can, in addition to their subsidy, 
also apply for a subordinated loan. For SME innovation 
studies and SME innovation the basic funding rates 
are respectively 50%  and 35%. The maximum subsidy 
amounts respectively to 25.000 EUR and 200 EUR. 
However for both cases additional support is possible 
on various specific grounds. 
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In order to model the determinants of the IWT to grant 
R&D subsidies to high tech SMEs, and to take into ac-
count a potential selection bias problem caused by the 
fact that the likelihood of applying for R&D subsidies 
may affect the model, we used a Heckman two-step 
procedure (see, for example, Greene 2000: 926-937). 
The first step involves estimating the likelihood of ap-
plication using an instrumental model. Stage two in-
volves estimating likelihood of R&D grant with the co-
efficients adjusted according to the results of the first 
stage. 
The instrumental regression (called selection equation 
in the Heckman model) estimates the probability that 
a young technology based firm will apply for a grant (in 
line with hypotheses 1-3).
Commercial Experience. Commercial experience was 
defined as commercial experience within a company, 
ranging from sales management to business devel-
opment, and was measured as the number of years 
cumulative experience of the management team. The 
founding teams in the overall sample on average had 
4.46 years of commercial experience (with a standard 
deviation of 7.55 years).
Technical Experience. Technical experience is defined 
as experience in a technical function within a corpo-
rate environment or in research in a research institu-
tion, and was measured as the number of years cumu-
lative technical experience of the management team. 
The founding teams in the overall sample on average 
had 14.06 years of technical experience (with a stand-
ard deviation of 14.55 years)
Amount of finance. Given the relatively low reliance 
by high tech start-ups on own financing, financing was 
measured as the amount of external financing (includ-
ing equity and debt financing). We used the log of the 
amount of financing raised within the first year after 
founding. The companies in our sample had on aver-
age raised 482 216 Euro of financing within the first 
eighteen months after start-up (standard deviation of 
1 430 576 Euro).  
The main regression model takes the following form. 
The controls took the form of a vector which included 
the growth of the company and the standardized resid-
ual of the auxiliary regression (equation 1). Dependent 
variables are financing, measured in the same way as 
in equation 1, a VC dummy, team heterogeneity and a 
patent application dummy. 
Venture capital. The VC dummy indicates whether or 
not the venture raised VC financing before applying for 
the grant. 47 companies raised VC financing. 
Degree of team heterogeneity. Following Ucbasaran 
et al. (2003) we employ Teachman’s (1980) scale to 
measure the heterogeneity of the team: (H) = -ΣPi (ln 
Pi). This measure takes into account how team mem-
bers are distributed among the different categories of 
a variable. The total number of categories of a variable 
equals 3, namely R&D experience, commercial expe-
rience and financial experience. Pi is defined as the 
number of years experience in function over the total 
team experience (measured as the number of years).
Patent application. Dummy variable indicating wheth-
er or not the R&D subsidy applicant had applied for a 
patent at the moment of R&D subsidy application. In 
total, 23 of the R&D subsidy applicants also applied 
for a patent. 13 of these companies applied for a pat-
ent before applying for the R&D subsidy. 
Further, we checked for risks of multicollinearity of the 
independent variables by calculating the variance in-
flation factors for each regression model. All variance 
inflation factors were below 3.0, indicating that multi-
collinearity is not an issue (Hair et al., 1998).  
Application for R&D subsidy (0/1) 
= F(technical experience, commercial experi-
ence, level of finance) (1)
Grant of R&D subsidy (0/1) 
= F(controls, financing, VC, team heterogeneity, 
patent application) (2)
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The descriptives for each of the variables are present-
ed below.
Applicants of R&D subsidies tended to have significant-
ly higher levels of technical experience (11 years on 
average for non-applicants, 15.2 years for applicants), 
and significantly lower levels of commercial experience 
(6.1 years for non-applicants, compared to 3.5 years 
for applicants). We did not find significant differences 
in founding capital between the two groups. Young 
technology based firms that received R&D subsidies 
tended to dispose of more initial financing (0.6 million 
compared to 0.45 million Euro). The univariate analy-
ses provided no indication of differences in team het-
erogeneity, growth rates nor VC funding between those 
that received R&D subsidies and those that did not. In 
table 2, we present the results of our multivariate anal-
ysis using the Heckman two stage selection model. 
Our first hypothesis is clearly supported: the more cap-
ital constraint a young technology based firm is, the 
higher the likelihood it will apply for R&D subsidies. 
Mean (s.d.) Application for R&D subsidy 
(0)
Application for R&D subsidy 
(1)
Technical experience 
(number of years)**
11.0 
(16.6)
15.2 
(14.6)
Commercial experience 
(number of years)***
6.1 
(10.6)
3.5 
(6.5)
Amount of finance 
(Euro)
212 470.1 
(691 950)
587 613.8 
(1 662 234)
N 62 158
R&D subsidy granted  
(0)
R&D subsidy granted 
(1)
Financing (Euro)* 468 073 
(1 022 930)
626 411 
(1 824 327)
VC (0/1) 0.24 
(0.44)
0.23 
(0.42)
Team heterogeneity 0.15 
(0.26)
0.23 
(0.32)
Absolute yearly growth 
in FTE’s
7.21 
(12.10)
18.91 
(32.80)
N 38 120
Table 1. Descriptives and univariate analyses
Kruskal Wallis Test levels of significance: * p< .10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01; **** p<.001
This suggests that IWT as an R&D granting institute 
does substitute the need for external finance. The 
findings do indicate that those new technology based 
firms which do not have external finance are likely to 
apply for an R&D grant. However, once external capital 
has been attracted, the likelihood of applying for an 
R&D grant decreases. So, grant money is seen as less 
interesting than external finance obtained from the 
commercial markets.
The results show that teams with high levels of com-
mercial experience are less likely to apply for R&D sub-
sidies (results significant at p<.001 level). Technical 
experience in the team does not make a difference. 
In other words, the self efficacy hypothesis does not 
tend to be symmetric. A commercial background does 
make a difference in the sense that founder / manag-
ers with such a commercial background do not con-
sider the R&D granting institute as an option where 
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they make a lot of chance of getting their project. Dur-
ing our interviews, one founder/managers repeatedly 
stated that IWT was an institute for engineers, not for 
innovative companies. This opinion tends to change 
at the moment these founder/managers have some-
body in the team who has been working in a research 
environment and therefore has some familiarity with 
the IWT. At that moment, the perception changes. The 
amount of technical experience does not matter any-
more afterwards. It is not because they have a longer 
research experience that they are more likely to apply 
for a project than those who have worked less long in a 
research environment. Just the fact of having worked 
in the research environment seems to be the most im-
portant.
 The determinants which predict application tend to be 
different from the ones that have an influence on the 
fact whether a project gets granted or not. We hypoth-
esized that the granting process follows much more 
the classic determinants which are found in the selec-
tion of projects by investors. Investors tend to attach a 
lot of attention to the team variable. In line with this, 
we find that heterogeneous teams experience a higher 
likelihood of receiving subsidies compared to more 
homogeneous teams, and therefore we find support 
for hypothesis four. Also the examination procedure 
in the R&D granting institute does take the quality of 
the team into account and therefore tends to select 
the projects which are anticipated to perform better. 
In contrast however to our hypothesis 5, we do not find 
support for the fact that IWT would see the projects 
which have already received venture capital as qualita-
tively better than those which have not received it. The 
univariate statistics suggested that the amount of cap-
ital might have a positive impact on the probability of 
effectively receiving a subsidy, but the Heckman model 
does not confirm this. This is surprising as having suf-
ficient capital to complement the subsidy which is lim-
ited to 50% of the total size of the project is one of the 
preconditions upon receiving such a subsidy. Further 
analysis is needed to explore this result. Neither do 
we find support for our hypothesis that having a patent 
application at the moment of grant application does 
matter to obtain the grant. This implies that patents 
are not considered a necessary indicator of quality by 
R&D granting institutes. This supports the idea that 
R&D grants are obtained before venture capitalists or 
business angels do invest in a high tech start-up. 
Full model
DV=subsidy granted (0/1)
Absolute yearly growth in FTE’s .14** 
(.06)
Team heterogeneity .24* 
(.13)
VC(0/1) -.18 
(.12)
Patents(0/1) .13 
(0.15)
Constant .65**** 
(.15)
Select
Technical experience .01 
(0.01)
Commercial experience -.03**** 
(0.01)
Amount of Finance -.05* 
(0.03)
Constant .47 
(0.15)
Mill’s Lambda -0.1 
(0.12)
LF test of indep Eqs Chi2
Mill’s ratio -.10 
(.26)
Table 2. Heckman Selection Model Results
Levels of significance: *p<.10; **p<.05; ***p<.01; 
****p<.001
Heckman selection model -- two-step estimates   (re-
gression model with sample selection) 
Number of obs      =       215
Censored obs        =        89
Uncensored obs    =       126
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This paper started off from the premise that study-
ing the impact of R&D subsidies requires a treatment 
effect model which controls for the probability that a 
given company applies for a subsidy. Received litera-
ture using these treatment effect models suffers from 
a lack of theoretical understanding why companies 
apply for R&D grants. Further the received literature 
does not make a difference between the determinants 
of applying for and those that impact the probability 
of getting an R&D subsidy. Still, the granting process 
might take very different aspects into account than 
those which determine the application behaviour. Fi-
nally, we stated that the received literature tends to 
look at large populations of companies that are very 
heterogeneous in terms of size and industry.
In this study, we tried to address this gap in the litera-
ture by a) focusing on a very well defined and homo-
geneous group of young, technology based firms ; b) 
theorizing about their application behaviour and their 
chances of receiving a subsidy and c) by making an ex-
plicit distinction between the application process and 
granting process. We find that organisational theories 
such as self efficacy theory do explain the behaviour 
of young technology based firms in terms of their likeli-
hood of applying for R&D grants. We find that young 
technology based firms of which the management has 
no experience with technology development and work-
ing in a research environment does consider the IWT 
to be an institute at which they have very little chance 
of receiving the grant. Therefore, they do not even ap-
ply for a subsidy. This finding suggests that simply pro-
moting the IWT as an innovation subsidy shop might 
not be sufficient to trigger these companies. Instead, 
more emphasis might be needed on the non-technical 
part of IWT. Recruiting bureaucrats with a non-techni-
cal background to perform subsidy evaluations might 
make the IWT more appealing. 
In addition to the self efficacy argument, we find in-
dications that the more capital constraint the com-
pany is, the more it will try to attract subsidies as a 
substitute for external finance on the private market. 
This is a clear hint, but not a real test yet, that IWT at-
tracts young technology based firms which cannot at-
tract money on the private market. However, this also 
means that IWT does not complement external finance 
on the private market. One can question whether there 
is not a lot of potential for the IWT to support young 
technology based firms which have already a signifi-
cant capital basis but which at the same time do make 
significant investments in R&D of which the risk could 
be diversified between private and public sources of 
money. In other words, the IWT could subsidize their 
R&D efforts to a greater extent than it does today.
We clearly show in the paper that the factors which 
determine whether a young technology based firm will 
get subsidies are clearly different from the ones where 
the young technology based firm does apply for R&D 
grants. In line with received literature, we find that also 
IWT tends to select the most promising projects at the 
commercial level. Doing so, they are very much in line 
with the venture capital community. Interestingly how-
ever, having venture capital does not seem to be a 
quality signal despite the lengthy due diligences which 
the latter actors tend to do. This is strange and might 
indicate that both communities do not know each oth-
er and, moreover, do not trust each others competen-
cies. This is confirmed by the fact that having venture 
capital seems to decrease the likelihood of applying 
for R&D subsidies as well.
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IWT wants to stimulate innovation in Flan-
ders:
By giving various organizations - particu-• 
larly SME’s – financial support to assist 
them in their innovation endeavors;
By stimulating companies, knowledge • 
centers, universities and other innova-
tion actors to cooperate;
By advising the Flemish government on • 
innovation policy issues.
M&A’s mission is to support IWT and its 
stakeholders to establish and improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of their innova-
tion tasks.
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